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Abs t r ac t . Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) has recently been proposed as 
a framework for mobile code safety in which the code supplier provides a pro-
gram together with an abstraction (or abstract model of the program) whose 
validity entails compliance with a predefined safety policy. The abstraction 
plays thus the role of safety certifícate and its generation is carried out auto-
matically by a fixed-point analyzer. The advantage of providing a (fixed-point) 
abstraction to the code consumer is that its validity is checked in a single pass 
(i.e., one iteration) of an abstract interpretation-based checker. A main chal-
lenge to make ACC useful in practice is to reduce the size of certificates as 
much as possible while at the same time not increasing checking time. The 
intuitive idea is to only include in the certifícate information that the checker 
is unable to reproduce without iterating. We introduce the notion of reduced 
certifícate which characterizes the subset of the abstraction which a checker 
needs in order to validate (and re-construct) the full certifícate in a single pass. 
Based on this notion, we instrument a generic analysis algorithm with the nec-
essary extensions in order to identify information which can be reconstructed 
by the single-pass checker. Finally, we study what the effects of reduced cer-
tificates are on the correctness and completeness of the checking process. We 
provide a correct checking algorithm together with sufficient conditions for 
ensuring its completeness. Our ideas are illustrated through a running exam-
ple, implemented in the context of constraint logic programs, which shows 
that our approach improves state-of-the-art techniques for reducing the size of 
certificates. 
1 Introduction 
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [15] is a general framework for mobile code safety which 
proposes to associate safety information in the form of a certifícate to programs. The 
certiñcate (or proof) is created at compile t ime by the certifier on the code supplier 
side, and it is packaged along with the code. The consumer who receives or downloads 
the (untrusted) code+certiñcate package can then run a checker which by an efficient 
inspection of the code and the certiñcate can verify the validity of the certiñcate and 
thus compliance with the safety policy. The key beneñt of this "certiñcate-based" 
approach to mobile code safety is tha t the consumer's task is reduced from the level 
of proving to the level of checking, a task tha t should be much simpler, efficient, and 
automatic than generating the original certiñcate. 
Abstraction-carrying code (ACC) [1, 8] has been recently proposed as an enabling 
technology for P C C in which an abstraction (or abstract model of the program) plays 
the role of certiñcate. An important feature of ACC is tha t not only the checking, but 
also the generation of the abstraction is automatically carried out by a ñxed-point 
analyzer. In this paper, we will consider analyzers which construct a program analy-
sis graph which is interpreted as an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of states 
explored by the concrete execution. To capture the different graph traversal strategies 
used in different fixed-point algorithms, we use the generic description of [9], which 
generalizes the algorithms used in state-of-the-art analysis engines. Essentially, the 
certiñcation/analysis carried out by the supplier is an iterative process which repeat-
edly traverses the analysis graph until a ñxpoint is reached. The analysis information 
inferred for each cali which appears during the (múltiple) graph traversals is stored in 
the answer table [9]. In the original ACC framework, the full answer table constitutes 
the certiñcate. The key idea is that, since the certiñcate is a ñxpoint, a single pass 
over the analysis graph is sufficient to validate the certiñcate in the consumer side. 
One of the main challenges for the practical uptake of ACC (and related methods) 
is to produce certiñcates which are reasonably small. This is important for at least 
the following reasons. First, the certiñcate is transmitted together with the untrusted 
code and, henee, reducing its size will presumably contribute to a smaller transmission 
time -very relevant for instance under scarce network connectivity conditions. Second, 
the certiñcate has to be stored on the consumer end in order to validate it and, 
henee, reducing its size is important in the realm of pervasive and embedded systems 
which typically have limited storage (and computing) resources. Nevertheless, a main 
concern when reducing the size of the certiñcate is that checking time is not increased 
as a consequence. In principie, the consumer could use an analyzer for the purpose 
of generating the whole ñxpoint from scratch, which is still feasible as analysis is 
automatic. However, this would defeat one of the main purposes of ACC, which is 
to reduce checking time. The objective of this paper is to characterize a subset of 
the abstraction which must be sent within a certiñcate -and which still guarantees 
a single pass checking process- and to design an ACC scheme which generates and 
validates such reduced certiñcates. 
The basic idea in order to reduce the size of the certiñcate in ACC checkers is 
to store only the analysis information which the checker is not able to reproduce by 
itself [12]. For instance, this general idea has been deployed in lightweight bytecode 
veriñeation [18] where the certiñcate, rather than being the whole set of frame types 
(FT) associated to each program point as obtained by standard bytecode veriñeation 
[12], is reduced by omitting those (local) program point FTs which correspond to 
instructions without branching and which are lesser than the ñnal FT (ñxpoint). Our 
proposal for ACC is at the same time more general (because of the parametricity 
of the ACC approach) and carries the reduction further because it includes only the 
analysis information of those calis in the analysis graph whose answers have been 
updated, including both branching and non branching instructions. The intuition is 
that, when there is at most one (initial) update during the computation of an entry in 
the answer table, the part of the analysis graph associated to it has been computed in 
one traversal, Le., its ñxpoint has been reached in a single pass. Henee, we can safely 
extract such information from the certiñcate and the checker should still be able to 
re-generate it in a single pass. The main contributions of this paper are: 
1. We introduce the notion of reduced certifícate which characterizes a subset of the 
abstraction which the checker needs in order to validate (and re-construct) the 
full certiñcate in a single pass. 
2. We instrument the generic analysis algorithm of [9] with the necessary extensions 
in order to identify the information which can be computed in one pass. 
3. We design a checker for reduced certiñcates which is corred, Le., if the checker 
succeeds in validating the certiñcate, then the certiñcate is valid for the program, 
no matter what the graph traversal strategy used is. 
4. Finally, we provide sufficient conditions for ensuring completeness of the checking 
process. Concretely, if the checker uses the same strategy as the analyzer then our 
proposed checker will succeed in validating any reduced certiñcate which is valid. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents a general 
view of ACC. Section 3 recalls the certiñeation process performed by the code supplier 
and illustrates it through our running example. In Section 4, we characterize the 
notion of reduced certiñcate and instrument a generic certiñer for its generation. 
Section 5 presents a correct and complete generic checker for reduced certiñcates. 
Finally, Section 6 discusses the work presented in this paper and some future work. 
2 A General View of Abstract ion-Carrying Code 
We assume the reader is familiar with abstract interpretation (see [6]) and (Con-
straint) Logic Programming (C)LP (see, e.g., [14] and [13]). 
A certiñer is a function certifier : Prog x ADom x AInt i—> ACert which for a 
given program P <G Prog, an abstract domain Da € ADom and a safety policy 
Ia S AInt generates a certiñcate Certa € ACert, by using an abstract interpreter for 
Da, which entails that P satisñes Ia. In the following, we denote that Ia and Certa 
are speciñcations given as abstract semantic valúes by using the same subscript a. 
The basics for deñning such certiñers (and their corresponding checkers) in ACC 
are summarized in the following six points: 
Approximation. We consider an abstract domain (Da,C.) and its corresponding 
concrete domain (2D, C), both with a complete lattice structure. Abstract valúes 
and sets of concrete valúes are related by an abstraction function a : 2D —> Da, 
and a concretization function 7 : Da —> 2D. An abstract valué y <G Da is a 
safe approximation of a concrete valué x £ D iff x £ 7(3/)- The concrete and 
abstract domains must be related in such a way that the following holds [6] Va; <G 
2D : j(a(x)) D x and \/y <G Da '• «(7(3/)) = y. In general IZ is induced by C 
and a. Similarly, the operations of least upper bound (U) and greatest lower bound 
(n) mimic those of 2D in a precise sense. 
Analysis. We consider the class of fixed-point semantics in which a (monotonic) 
semantic operator, Sp, is associated to each program P. The meaning of the 
program, [[PJ, is deñned as the least ñxed point of the Sp operator, Le., [[PJ = 
lfp(Sp). If Sp is continuous, the least ñxed point is the limit of an iterative 
process involving at most ui applications of Sp starting from the bottom element 
of the lattice. Using abstract interpretation, we can usually only compute |P]] a , 
as \P\a = Ifp('Sp)- The operator Sp is the abstract counterpart of Sp. 
analyzer(P, Da) = lfp(S") = [P ] Q = Certa (1) 
Correctness of analysis ensures that |P]]a safely approximates [[PJ, Le., [[PJ <G 
7(WJ. 
Verification Condition. Let Certa be a safe approximation of P . If an abstract 
safety speciñcation Ia can be proved w.r.t. Certa, then P satisñes the safety 
policy and Certa is a valid certiñcate: 
Certa is a valid certifícate for P w.r.t. Ia if Certa E la (2) 
Certifier. Together, equations (1) and (2) deñne a certiñer which provides program 
ñxpoints, |P]] a , as certiñcates which entail a given safety policy, Le., by taking 
Certa = lPía-
Checking. A checker is a function checker: Prog x ADom x ACert 1—> 600/ which for 
a program P <G Prog, an abstract domain Da € ADom and certiñcate Certa € 
ACert checks whether Certa is a ñxpoint of Sp or not: 
checker(P, Da,Certa) returns true iff (Sp(Certa) =Certa) (3) 
Verification Condition Regeneration. To retain the safety guarantees, the con-
sumer must regenérate a trustworthy veriñcation condition -Equation 2- and use 
the incoming certifícate to test for adherence of the safety policy. 
P is trusted iff Certa IZ Ia (4) 
A fundamental idea in ACC is that, while analysis -equation (1)- is an iterative 
process, checking -equation (3)- is guaranteed to be done in a single pass over the 
abstraction. 
3 Generation of Certificates in Abstraction-Carrying Code 
This section recalls ACC in the context of (C)LP [1]. For concreteness, we build on 
the algorithms of CiaoPP [10], the abstract interpretation-based preprocessor of the 
Ciao multi-paradigm CLP system. 
3.1 The Analysis Algorithm 
Algorithm 1 has been presented in [9] as a generic description of a ñxed-point al-
gorithm which generalizes those used in generic analysis engines, such as the one in 
CiaoPP [10]. In order to analyze a program, traditional (goal dependent) abstract 
interpreters for (C)LP programs receive as input, in addition to the program P and 
the abstract domain Da, a set Sa <G A Atora of cali patterns. 
Such cali patterns are pairs of the form A : CP where A is a procedure descriptor 
and CP is an abstract substitution (Le., a condition of the run-time bindings) of A 
expressed as CP <G Da. For brevity, we sometimes omit the subscript a from Sa in 
the algorithms. The analyzer constructs an and-or graph [4] (or analysis graph) for 
Sa which is an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of (possibly infinite) and-or 
trees explored by the concrete execution of initial calis described by Sa in P. 
The program analysis graph is implicitly represented in the algorithm of [9] by 
means of two data structures, the answer table and the dependency are table. Program 
rules are assumed to be normalized: only distinct variables are allowed to oceur as 
arguments to atoms. Furthermore, we require that each rule defining a predicate p 
has identical sequence of variables xpi,... xPn in the head atom, Le., p(xpi,... xPn). 
We cali this the base form of p. The answer table contains entries of the form A : 
CP i—> AP where A is always a base form. A dependency are is of the form Hk '• 
CPQ =>• [CPi] Bk¿ : CíV This is interpreted as follows: if the rule with Hk as head is 
called with description CPQ then this causes that the i-th literal Bk¿ to be called with 
description CP2. The remaining part CP\ is the program annotation just before B¡.i 
is reached and contains information about all variables in rule k. As we will see below, 
dependency ares are used for forcing recomputation until a fixed-point is reached. 
Intuitively, the analysis algorithm is a graph traversal algorithm which places 
entries in the answer table and dependency are table as new nodes and ares in the 
program analysis graph are encountered. To capture the different graph traversal 
strategies used in different fixed-point algorithms, we use a priority queue. Thus, the 
third, and final, structure used in the algorithm is a prioritized event queue. In the 
following, we use Q <G QHS to refer to a Queue Handling Strategy which a particular 
instance of the generic algorithm may use. Clearly, Q determines the graph traversal 
strategy and it is a parameter of the algorithm. Events are of three forms: 
— newcall(A : CP) which indicates that a new cali pattern for literal A with de-
scription CP has been encountered. 
— arc(Hk :_=>[_] Bk¿ '• -) which indicates that the rule with Hk as head needs to 
be (re)computed from the position k,i. 
A l g o r i t h m 1 Generic Analyzer for Abstraction-Carrying Code 
procedure ANALYZE_F(S, Q) 
for A : CP € S do 
add-event(newcall(A : CP), Q) 
while E := next_event(J?) do 
if E = newcall(A : CP) then new_call_pattern(A : CP, Q) 
else if E = updated(A : CP) then add_dependent_rules(A : CP, Q) 
else if E = arc(R) then process_arc(P, Q) 
return answer table 
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procedure NEW_CALL_PATTERN(A : CP, Q) 
for all rule Ak : —Bk,i, • • •, Bk,nk do 
CPo :=Aextend{CP, vars(Bk,i, • • •, Bk,nk)) 
CP! := Arestnct(CP0, vars(Bk,i)) 
add_event(arc(Afc : CP => [CP0] Bk,i : CPi),í2) 
AP := initial-guess(A : CP) 
if AP ^ _L then add_event(«petóed(A : CP), Í2) 
add A : CP i—• AP to answer table 
procedure ADD_DEPENDENT_RULES(A : CP, Q) 
for all are of the form Hk '• CPo =>• [CPi] Bk,i '• CP2 in graph where there exists 
renaming a s.t. A : CP = (Bk,i '• CP2)a do 
add_event(arc(iífc : CP0 => [CP!] Bk,i : CP2), Í2) 
procedure PROCESS_ARC(iífc : CP0 =>• [CPi] Bk,i : CP2,Q) 
if Bk,i is not a constraint then 
add Hk : CPo =>• [CPi] Bk,i '• CP2 to dependeney are table 
W := vars(Ak :- Bk,i, • • • ,Bk,nk) 
CP3 := get_answer(Bfc,¿ : CP2, CPx,W, Q) 
if CP3 7^  _L and i =/= rik then 
CP4 := Arestrict(CP3, vars(Bk,i+i)) 
add_event( arc(Hk : CPo =*> [CP3] Bfc,¿+i : CP4),Í2) 
else if CP3 7^  _L and i = rik then 
AP\ := Arestr\ct(CP3,vars(Hk)) 
insert_answer_info(ií : CPo 1—> .APi, J?) 
function GET_ANSWER(L : CP2, CP\, W, Q) 
if L is a constraint then return Aadd(L, CPi) 
else APo '•= lookup_answer(L : CP2, O) 
AP! := Aextend(^P0,T^) 
return Aconj(CPi, APi) 
function LOOKUP_ANSWER(A : CP, Q) 
if there exists a renaming a s.t.cr(A : CP) 1—• AP in answer table then 
return a~1(AP) 
else add_event(newcaii(cr(A : CP)), Q) where a is renaming s.t. a (A) in base form 
return _L 
procedure INSERT_ANSWER_INFO(ií : CP i-> AP, Q) 
APo '•= lookup_answer(ií : CP) 
AP! := Alub(^P,^P 0 ) 
if APo ^ AP! then 
add (H : CP 1—• APi) to answer table 
add_e\/ent(updated(H : CP), Q) 
— updated(A : CP) which indicates tha t the answer description to cali pa t te rn A 
with description CP has been changed. 
The algorithm is deñned in terms of four abstract operations on the domain Da: 
— Arestrict(CP, V) performs the abstract restriction of a description CP to the set 
of variables in the set V, denoted vars(V); 
— Aextend(CP, V) extends the description C P to the variables in the set V; 
— Aconj(CPi, CP2) performs the abstract conjunction of two descriptions; 
— Alub(CPi, CP2) performs the abstract disjunction of two descriptions. 
Apart from the parametric description domain-dependent functions, the algorithm has 
several other undeñned functions. The functions adcLevent and next_event respectively 
add an event t o the priority queue and return (and delete) the event of highest priority, 
according to Q. The function ¡nitiaLguess returns an initial guess for the answer to a 
new cali pat tern. The default valué is ± but if the cali pa t te rn is more general than 
an already computed cali then the answer valué for the more particular cali can be 
returned.4 
The algorithm centers around the processing of events on the priority queue, which 
repeatedly removes the highest priority event (Line 4) and calis the appropriate event-
handling function (L5-7). The function new_call_pattern initiates processing of the rules 
in the deñnition of the internal literal A, by adding are events for each of the ñrst 
literals of these rules (L13), and determines an initial answer for the cali pa t te rn 
(L14) and places this in the table (L16). The function process_arc performs the core 
of the analysis. It performs a single step of the left-to-right traversal of a rule body. 
If the literal Bk¿ is not a constraint (L21), the are is added to the dependency are 
table (L22). Constraints are simply added to the current description (L32). Literals 
are processed by function get_answer. In this function, the current answer to tha t 
literal for the current description is looked up (L33). The function lookup_answer ñrst 
looks up an answer for the given cali pat tern in the answer table (L37) and if it is 
not found, it places a newcall event (L39). When it ñnds one, then this answer is 
extended to the variables in the rule the literal oceurs in (L34) and conjoined with 
the current description (L35). The resulting answer (L24) is either used to genérate 
a new are event to process the next literal in the rule if B¡.i is not the last literal 
(L25); otherwise the new answer for the rule is combined with the current answer 
in ¡nsert_answerJnfo (L30). Finally, ¡nsert_answer_¡nfo, updates the answer table entry 
when a new answer is found (L46). The function add_dependent_rules adds are events 
for each dependency are which depends on the cali pa t te rn A : CP for which the 
answer has been updated. More details on the algorithm can be found in [9,17].5 
3.2 R u n n i n g E x a m p l e 
Our running example is the program r e c t o y taken from [19]. We will use it to illustrate 
our algorithms and show tha t our approach improves state-of-the-art techniques for 
reducing the size of certiñeates. In all our examples, abstract substitutions over a set 
of variables V, assign a regular type [7] to each variable in V. We use term as the most 
general type (Le., term corresponds to all possible terms). For brevity, variables whose 
regular type is term are often not shown in abstract substitutions. Also, when it is 
clear from the context, an abstract substi tution for an atom p{x\,... ,xn) is shown as 
a tupie (ti,..., tn), such tha t each valué t¿ indicates the type of x¿. The most general 
substi tution T assigns term to all variables in V. The least general substi tution ± 
assigns the empty set of valúes to each variable. 
Example 1. Consider the Ciao versión of procedure r e c t o y [19] and the cali pa t te rn 
rec toy(N, M) : ( int , term) which indicates tha t external calis to r e c t o y are performed 
with an integer valué in the ñrst argument. 
rectoy(N.M) : - N = 0 , M = 0. 
rectoy(N.M) : - N l i s N - l , r e c t o y ( N l , R ) , M i s Nl+R. 
We now distinguish four main steps carried out in the analysis using some Q <G QHS: 
4
 This case is only possible for calis to ANALYZE_F with the answer table not empty. 
6
 It is also illustrated in Appendix A through an example for reviewing purposes. 
A. The initial event newcal l ( rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) ) introduces the ares A\¿ and 
^2,1 in the queue, each one corresponds to the rules in the order above: 
Aíyí : arc(rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) => [{N/int}] N = 0 : {N/ in t}) 
A2y\ : arc(rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) => [{N/int}] NI i s N - 1 : {N/ in t}) 
The initial answer E\ rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) i—> ± provided by ¡nitiaLguess is 
inserted in the answer table. Label E\ is introduced for future reference. 
B. Assume tha t Q has assigned higher priority to Aii. The procedure get_answer 
simply adds the constraint N = 0 to the description { N / i n t } . Upon return, as it 
is not the last body atom (L25), the following are event is generated: 
Aíy2 : arc(rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) => [{N/int}] M = 0 : {M/term}) 
Are A\fl is handled exactly as A\¿ and get_answer simply adds the constraint M = 
0, returning { N / i n t , M / i n t } . As it is the last atom in the body (L28), procedure 
¡nsert_answer_¡nfo computes Alub between ± and the above answer and overwrites 
E\ with E[ rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) i—> ( i n t , i n t ) . Therefore, the event U\ 
updated(rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) ) is introduced in the queue. Note tha t no 
dependency has been originated during the proeessing of this rule (as both body 
atoms are constraints). 
C. Now, Q can choose between the proeessing of U\ or ^ 2 , 1 . Let us assume tha t 
^2,1 has higher priority. For its proeessing, we have to assume tha t predeñned 
functions "—", "+" and " i s " are dealt by the algorithm as s tandard constraints 
(see [2] for further details) by just using the following information provided by 
the system: 
-E-2 
E3 
C i s A + B : 
C i s A - B : 
( i n t , i n t , term) i—> ( i n t , i n t , i n t ) 
( i n t , i n t , term) i—> ( i n t , i n t , i n t ) 
In particular, after analyzing the subtraction with the initial cali pat tern, we infer 
tha t NI is of type i n t and no dependency is asserted. Next, the are: 
A2,2 • arc(rectoy(N, M) : ( int , term) =>• [{N/int, Nl/int}] rectoy(Nl,R) : (int, term}) 
is introduced in the queue and the corresponding dependency is stored in the 
dependency are table. The cali to get_answer returns the current answer for E[. 
Using this answer we get the are A2 3: 
^2,3 : arc(rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) => 
[{N/int , N l / i n t , R / in t} ] M i s Nl + R: { N l / i n t , R / i n t } ) 
Clearly, the proeessing of A2 3 does not change the ñnal answer E[. Henee, no 
more updates are introduced in the queue. 
D. Finally, we have to process the event U\ introduced in step B to which Q has 
assigned lowest priority. The procedure add_dependent_rules ñnds the dependency 
corresponding to are ^2,2 and inserís it in the queue. This relaunches an are 
identical to ^2,2- This in tu rn launches an are identical to ^2 ,3 . However, the 
reprocessing does not change the ñxpoint result E[ and analysis terminates. 
A fundamental issue here is tha t if we use some Í2' <G QHS which assigns a priority to 
U\ higher than to ^ 2 , 1 , the whole reprocessing of ^2,2 and ^2,3 in step D will not be 
performed. The reason is tha t the dependency are table is empty prior to proeessing 
^2,2- Henee add_dependent_rules would not introduce any are. This corresponds to the 
notion of redundant upda te which we will introduce in Def. 2. D 
3.3 Full Certifícate 
The following deñnition corresponds to the essential idea in the ACC framework -
equations (1) and (2)- of using a static analyzer to genérate the certiñcates. The 
analyzer corresponds to Algorithm 1 and the certifícate is the full answer table. 
Definition 1 (full certifícate). We define function CERTIFIER_F:Prog x ADom x 
AAtom x AInt x QHS i—> ACert which takes P £ Prog, Da £ ADom, Sa £ AAtom, 
Ia £ AInt, Í2 £ QHS and returns as full certifícate, FCert £ ACert, the answer table 
computed by ANALYZE_F(S'a, Í2) for P in Da iff FCert C Ia. 
Example 2. Consider the safety policy expressed by the following speciñcation Ia : 
rectoy(N,M) : (int,term) i—> (int,real) . The certiñer in Def. 1 returns as valid cer-
tifícate the single entry E[. Clearly E[ IZ Ia. We assume that predeñned information 
is available for the consumer, otherwise entries E2 and E$ should be included in the 
certifícate. D 
4 Abstraction-Carrying Code with Reduced Certiñcates 
The key observation in order to reduce the size of certiñcates is that certain entries 
in a certifícate may be irrelevant, in the sense that the checker is able to reproduce 
them by itself in a single pass. The notion of relevance is directly related to the idea 
of recomputation in the program analysis graph. Intuitively, given an entry in the 
answer table A : CP 1—> AP, its ñxpoint may have been computed in several itera-
tions from ±, APQ, API,... until AP. For each change in the answer, an updated 
event updated (A : CP) is generated during analysis. The above entry is relevant in a 
certifícate (under some strategy) when its updates forcé the recomputation of other 
ares in the graph which depend on A : CP. Thus, unless A : CP 1—> AP is included 
in the (reduced) certifícate, a single-pass checker which uses the same strategy as the 
code producer will not be able to validate the certifícate. 
4.1 The Notion of Reduced Certifícate 
According to the above intuition, we are interested in determining when an entry in 
the answer table has been "updated" during analysis. However, there are two special 
types of updated events which can be considered "irrelevant". The ñrst one is called 
redundant update and corresponds to the kind of updates which are similar to event 
U\ generated in step B of Ex. 1. We write DAT\A.CP to denote the set of ares of the 
form H : CP0 => \CPi\B : CPZ in the current dependeney are table such that they 
depend on A : CP, i.e., A : CP = (B : CPg)cr for some renaming a. 
Definition 2 (redundant update). Let P £ Prog, Sa £ AAtom and Q £ QHS. 
We say that an event updated^.A : CP) which appears in the event queue during the 
analysis of P for Sa is redundant w.r.t. Q iff DAT\A.CP = 0-
It should be noted that redundant updates can only be generated by updated events 
for cali patterns which belong to Sa. Otherwise, DAT\A.CP cannot be empty. 
Example 3. In our running example, U\ is redundant for Q at the moment it is gen-
erated. However, since the event has been given low priority, its processing is delayed 
until the end. There is a matching dependeney when U\ is actually handled by proce-
dure add_dependent_rules. This causes the unnecessary re-computation of the second 
are for rectoy (^2,2). In the following section, we propose a slight modiñeation to the 
analysis algorithm so that redundant updates are executed as soon as they appear. D 
P r o p o s i t i o n 1. Let Í2 £ QHS. Let Í2' £ QHS be a strategy which assigns the highest 
priority to any updated event which is redundant. Then, V P £ Prog, Da £ ADom, 
Sa £ AAtom, ANALYZE-F(Sa,f2) = ANALYZE_F(/S'a,i7'/). 
The second type of updates which can be considered irrelevant are initial updates 
which, under certain circumstanees, are generated in the ñrst pass over an are. In 
particular, we do not take into account updated events generated when the answer 
table contains ± for the updated entry. Note tha t this case still corresponds to the 
ñrst traversal of any are and should not be considered as a reprocessing. 
Def in i t ion 3 ( init ial u p d a t e ) . In the conditions of Def. 2, we say that an event 
updated (A : CP) which appears in the event queue during the analysis of P for Sa is 
initial for Í2 if when it is generated,, the answer table contains A : CP i—> _L 
Initial updates do not oceur in certain very optimized algorithms, like the one in [17]. 
However, they are necessary to model generic graph traversal strategies. In particular, 
they are intended to awake ares whose evaluation has been suspended. 
Example 4- Suppose tha t we use a strategy fi" £ QHS such tha t step C in Ex. 1 is 
performed before B. Then, when the answer for rectoy(Nl,R) : ( int , term) is looked 
up, procedure get_answer returns ± and thus the processing of are ^2,2 is suspended 
at this point (see L25 in Algorithm 1). Next, we proceed with the remaining are A\¿ 
which is processed exactly as in step B. Now, the updated event U\ is not redundant 
for Í2", as there is a dependeney introduced by the former processing of are ^2,2 in 
the table. Therefore, the processing of U\ introduces the suspended are A22 again 
in the queue. The important point is tha t the fact tha t U\ inserís ^2,2 must not 
be considered as a reprocessing, since ^2,2 had been suspended and its continuation 
(^2,3 in this case) has not been handled by the algorithm yet. D 
Relevant updates which are neither redundant ñor initial forcé (re)computation. 
Def in i t ion 4 (relevant u p d a t e ) . In the conditions of Def. 2, we say that an event 
updated (^ 4 : CP) which appears in the event queue during the analysis of P for Sa is 
relevant for Í2 if it is not initial ñor relevant for Í2. 
The key idea is tha t those answer pat terns whose computation has introduced relevant 
updates should be available in the certiñeate. 
Def in i t ion 5 (relevant e n t r y ) . In the conditions of Def. 2, we say that the entry 
A : CP 1—> AP in the answer table is relevant for Í2 iff there has been at least one 
relevant event updated (A : CP) during the analysis of P for Sa. 
The notion of reduced certifícate allows us to remove irrelevant entries from the answer 
table and produce a smaller certiñeate which can still be validated in one pass. 
Def in i t ion 6 ( reduced cert i f ícate) . In the conditions of Def. 2 and let FCert = 
ANALYZE_F(5'a, Í2) for P and Sa. We define the reduced certifícate, RCert, as the set 
of relevant entries in FCert w.r.t. Í2. 
Example 5. From now on, in our running example, we assume the strategy fi' £ QHS 
which assigns the highest priority to redundant updates . For this strategy, the entry 
E[ rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) 1—> ( i n t , i n t ) in Example 1 is not relevant for Í2' as 
there has been no relevant updated event in the queue (U\ is redundant) . Therefore, 
the reduced certiñeate for our running example is empty. In the next section, we show 
t ha t our checker is able to reconstruct the ñxpoint in a single pass from the empty 
certifícate.6 D 
For function r e c t o y in Example 1, lightweight bytecode veriñcation [19] sends, to-
gether with the program, the reduced non-empty certifícate cert = ({30 i—> (e,rectoy-
int • int • int • ± ) } , e), which states tha t in program point 30, the stack does not con-
tain information (ñrst occurrence of e),7 and variables N, M and R have type int, 
int and ± . The need of sending this information is because r ec toy , implemented in 
Java, contains an ¿/-branch (equivalent to the branching for selecting one of our two 
clauses for rectoy). And cert has to inform the checker tha t it is possible tha t in point 
30 variable R is undeñned, if the if condition does not hold. As showed in the above 
example, our approach improves on state-of-the-art P C C techniques by reducing the 
certiñcate even further while still keeping the checking process one-pass. 
4.2 G e n e r a t i o n of Cert i f icates w i t h o u t Irrelevant Entr i e s 
In Algorithm 2, we instrument the analyzer of Algorithm 1 with the extensions nec-
essary for producing reduced certiñcates, according to Def. 6. Let us briefly explain 
the analysis algorithm for reduced certiñcates, A N A L Y Z E _ R . Essentially, we associate 
to each entry in the answer table a new ñeld with the boolean u whose purpose is to 
indicate whether the entry is relevant. Now, an entry in the answer table is of the form 
A(u) : CP i—> AP. In the algorithm, we still use the previous notation A : CP i—> AP 
while we access the ñeld u by using function get_from_answer_table and procedure 
set_in_answer_table. A cali M=get_from_answer_table(^4 : CP) looks up in the answer ta-
ble the entry for A : CP and returns its w-value. A cali set_in_answer_table(^4(w) : CP i—> 
AP) replaces the entry for A : CP with the new one A(u) : CP i—> AP. If such entry 
does not exist, then it simply adds it. AU entries initially have the valué False for u, 
Le., L16 of ANALYZE_F is replaced by "16: set_¡n_answer_table(A(/aZse) : CP i-» AP)" in 
Algorithm 2. The remaining procedures remain identical except for ¡nsert_answer_¡nfo 
whose new deñnition appears in Algorithm 2. The characterization of relevant update 
is performed in this procedure as follows. L5 is in charge of removing redundant up-
dates. The case of initial updates is captured in LIO. L13 allows us to identify relevant 
updates . 
A l g o r i t h m 2 Analyzer A N A L Y Z E _ R 
1: procedure INSERT_ANSWER_INFO(ií : CP i-> AP, Q) 
2: AP0 : = lookup_answer(ií : CP, Í2) 
3: APÍ := A\ub(AP, APo) 
4: if AP0 ^ APí then 
5: if DAT\H-.GP = 0 then % redundant updates 
6: w=get_from_answer_table(ií : CP) 
7: set_in_answer_table(ií(w) : CP i—> APi) 
8: else 
9: add_event(updated(H : CP), Q) 
10: if APo = _L then % mitmi
 Upd»teS 
11: w=get_from_answer_table(ií : CP) 
12: set.in_answer.table(ií(w) : CP ^ AP!) 
13: else set_in_answer_table(ií(írwe) : CP t-^ APi) % reiev»nt
 Upd»te 
It should be noted that, using Q as in Example 1, the answer is obtained by performing 
two analysis iterations over the are associated to the second rule of rectoy(N, M) (steps C 
and D) due to the fact that Ui has been delayed and become relevant for Q. 
7
 The second occurrence of e indicates that there are no backwards jumps. 
Example 6. Consider the four steps performed in the analysis of our running example. 
In step A, the answer E\ is initialized with u equal to false in L16. Then, in step B, 
the procedure ¡nsert_answer_¡nfo checks that the condition in L5 holds. Therefore, the 
entry is updated with the new answer but its u status does not change and it is 
considered non relevant (in fact the update is redundant). Both steps C and D do not 
satisfy the condition in L4. Henee, upon return, the status of u for E[ is still False. D 
Proposition 2. Let P G Prog, Da G ADom, Sa G AAtom, fl G QHS. Let FCert 
be the answer table computed by ANALYZE_R(/S'a, fl) for P in Da. Then, an entry 
A(u) : CPA I—> AP G FCert is relevant iffu is trae. 
Note that, except for the control of relevant entries, ANALYZE_F(S'a, íí) and ANA-
LYZE_R(S'a, íí) have the same behaviour, they compute the same answer table (see 
Proposition 3 in Appendix B). When the analysis terminates, in order to obtain the 
reduced certiñcate, we use function removeJrrelevant_answers which takes a set of 
answers of the form A(u) : CP i—> AP G FCert and returns, RCert, the set of answers 
A : CP i—> AP such that u is true. 
Definition 7. We define the function CERTIFIER_R: Prog x ADom x AAtom x AInt x 
QHS i—> AC'ert, which takes P G Prog, Da G ADom, Sa G AAtom, Ia G AInt, 
fl G QHS. It returns as certifícate, RCert =remove_irrelevant_answers(FCert); where 
FCert =ANALYZE_R(/S'a,i7/); iff FCert C Ia. 
5 Checking Reduced Certificates 
In the ACC framework for full certiñeates, the checking algorithm [1] uses a speciñe 
graph traversal strategy fie- This checker has been shown to be very efficient but in 
turn its design is not generic with respect to this issue (in contrast to the analysis 
design).8 This is not problematic in the context of full certiñeates as, even if the 
certiñer uses a strategy f¿A different from fie, it is ensured that all valid certiñeates 
get validated in one pass by such speciñe checker. Unfortunately, this does not hold 
anymore in the case of reduced certiñeates. In particular, completeness of checking is 
not guaranteed if QA ^ ^c • This oceurs because though the answer table is identical 
for all strategies, the subset of redundant entries depends on the particular strategy 
used. The problem is that, if there is an entry A : CP i—> AP in FCert such that it is 
relevant w.r.t. fie but it is not w.r.t. QA, then a single pass checker will fail to validate 
the RCert generated using f¿A- Therefore, it is essential in this context to design generic 
checkers which are not tied to a particular graph traversal strategy. Upon receiving the 
appropriate parameters from the supplier, the consumer uses the particular instance 
of the generic checker resulting from application of such parameters. 
It should be noted that the design of generic checkers is also relevant in light of 
current trends in veriñed analyzers (e.g., [11,5]), which could be transferred directly 
to the checking end. In particular, since the design of the checking process is generic, 
it becomes feasible in ACC to use automatic program transformers to specialize a 
certiñed (speciñe) analysis algorithm in order to obtain a certiñed checker with the 
same strategy while preserving correetness and completeness. 
5.1 The Generic Checking Algorithm 
The following deñnition presents a generic checker for validating reduced certiñeates. 
In addition to the genericity issue discussed above, a important difference with the 
8
 Note, however, that both the analysis and checking algorithms are always parametric on 
the abstract domain, with the resulting genericity, which allows proving a wide variety of 
properties by using the large set of already available domains, being one of the fundamental 
advantages of ACC. 
checker for full certiñcates [1] is tha t there are certain entries which are not available in 
the certifícate and tha t we want to reconstruct and output in checking. The reason for 
this is tha t the safety policy has to be tested w.r.t. the full answer table -Equat ion (2). 
Therefore, the checker must reconstruct, from RCert, the answer table returned by 
A N A L Y Z E _ F , FCert, in order to test for adherence to the safety policy -Equat ion (4). 
The checker can identify two sources of errors: a) a relevant update is needed to obtain 
an answer (cannot be obtained in one pass), b) the answer in the certiñcate is more 
precise than the one obtained by the checker (the certiñcate and program at hand 
do not correspond to each other). In both cases, the checker has to issue Error. Note 
tha t reconstructing the answer table does not add any additional cost compared to 
the checker in [1], since the full answer table also has t o be created in [1]. In the 
deñnition below, we star t from A N A L Y Z E _ F rather than from A N A L Y Z E _ R because 
the instrumentation for classifying updated events is not needed for the purpose of 
checking. 
D e f i n i t i o n 8 ( checke r for r e d u c e d c e r t i f i c a t e s ) . Function C H E C K I N G _ R is de-
fined as function ANALYZE_F with the following modifications: 
1. It receives RCert as an additional input parameter. 
2. It mail fail to produce an answer table. In that case it issues an Error. 
3. It uses the trivial initiaLguess function which returns _L for any cali pattern. 
4- Function insert-answerJnfo is replaced by the new one in Fig 3. 
A l g o r i t h m 3 Generic Checker for Reduced Certiñcates C H E C K I N G _ R 
1: p rocedure INSERT_ANSWER_INFO(ií : CP i-> AP, Q, RCert) 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
8: 
9: 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
APo : = lookup_answer(ií : CP, Í2) 
(IsIn,AP')=look_fixpoint(ií : CP,RCert) 
if AP0 = _L t h e n process_initial_update(IsIn,AP',ií : CP i-» AP,Q) 
else if Isln t h e n % c»™ 1.2 
if Alub(^4P, APo) =/= AP' t h e n return Error % error tyPo b) second update 
else % c»so 2.2 
AP! := A\ub(AP,AP0) 
if DAT\H-.CP = 0 t h e n add H : CP i-> APi to answer table 
else if APo 7^  APi t h e n return Error % reievant update, error tyPo ») 
function LOOK_FIXPOINT(A : CP,RCert) 
if 3 a renaming a such that a(A : CP 1—• AP) G RCert t h e n returns (True,cr_1(AP)) 
else return (False,_L) 
function PROCESS_INITIAL_UPDATE(IsIn,AP',ií : CP i-> AP, Q) 
if Isln t h e n % c»™ 1.1 
if Alub(^4P, AP1) 7^  AP' t h e n return Error % error tyPe b) for fi™t update 
else add H : CP t-^ AP' to answer table 
else add H : CP t-^ AP to answer table % c»™ 2.1 
if DAT\H-.CP ^ 0 and A P / 1 t h e n add_event(updated(H : CP), Q) 
Function C H E C K E R _ R takes P G Prog, Da G ADom, Sa G AAtom, Q G QHS, RCert 
G ACert and returns the result of CHECKING_R(/S'a, Í2, RCert,) for P in Da. 
Let us briefly explain Algorithm 3. We distinguish four main cases in the algorithm by 
combining: 1) whether there is an entry for the cali pa t te rn in the certiñcate or not, 
2) if it is the ñrst t ime the cali pa t te rn is processed (initial update) or not. We use 
function look.fixpoint for ñnding out 1). A cali look_fixpoint(ií : CP,RCert) returns a 
tupie (IsIn,APr) such tha t : if H : CP is in RCert, then Isln is equal to True and AP' 
returns the ñxpoint stored in RCert. Otherwise, Isln is equal to False and AP' is ± . 
Isln=true. There are two cases which are distinguished in L4: 
1.1. Initial update. This corresponds to the case when APQ = ± in L4. Now pro-
cessJnitiaLupdate is executed. L16 checks if the ñrst computed solution AP 
for H : CP is more general than AP' (answer in RCert). This case corresponds 
to an Error of type b). Otherwise, L17 introduces in the answer table the ñx-
point for H : CP. Finally, if the initial update is non redundant (L19), it is 
launched in order to awake suspended ares in the dependeney are table. 
1.2. Next updates. Only L6 is executed to check whether the ñxpoint of H : CP 
(already stored in the answer table) is more general or equal than the partial 
computed solution AP. Otherwise, an Error type b) is issued. 
Isln=false. The same cases as above are distinguished in L4: 
2.1. Initial update. In this case, processJnitiaLupdate stores AP as ñrst answer for 
H : CP (L18), and the corresponding initial update event is launched (L19). 
2.2. Next updates. After this ñrst one, the next partial solutions cannot genérate 
relevant updates or the algorithm issues an Error (LIO). This ensures that the 
checking process is done in a single pass. If no relevant updates are generated, 
a new answer for H : CP is computed (L8-9). 
Note that, although CHECKER_R has information in RCert about certain answers, 
function ¡nitiaLguess does not consult it and instead introduces ± initially. The reason 
is that initial updates are needed in order to awake the possibly suspended computa-
tions which depend on the answers not available in RCert. This does not occur in the 
checking of [1] because certiñeates are full and suspensión never oceurs. 
Example 7. Following Example 1, we assume that an empty certiñeate is sent along 
with the untrusted code. Let us compare the fours steps performed in the analysis 
(see Example 6) with the corresponding CHECKER_R which uses the same QHS: 
A. This step is executed identically by the checker. E\ is inserted. 
B. The difference in this step is that the redundant update U\ is not generated 
because in LIO the checker realizes that there are no dependencies for its cali. 
C. Exactly the same events and the same answer as computed in step C of analysis 
occur here. 
D. This step is not performed because U\ is not in the queue. 
Notice that, as expected, the reprocessing carried out in step D of analysis is not 
performed during checking and, henee, the program is validated in a single pass over 
the analysis graph. D 
5.2 Completeness and Correctness Resul ts 
The following theorem ensures that if CHECKER_R validates a certiñeate (i.e., it does 
not return Error), then the re-constructed answer table is a ñxpoint. This implies that 
any certiñeate which gets validated by the checker is indeed a valid one. 
Theorem 1 (correctness). Let P <G Prog, Da <S ADom, Sa <S A Atora, Ia <S AInt 
and Í¿A,^C € QHS. Let FCert= CERTIFIER-F^P, Da,Sa,Ia, &A) and RCert= CER-
TIFIER_R(P, Da, Sa, Ia, ^A)- If CHECKER_R( /P, Da, Sa, Ia, RCert, fic) does not issue 
an Error, then it returns FCert. 
As already mentioned, using a CHECKER_R with a strategy fie, we may fail to validate 
a reduced certiñeate which is indeed valid for the program, though reduced w.r.t. 
another strategy QA ^ &c- This is illustrated in the example below. 
Example 8. Consider the analysis of the following simple program w.r.t. the cali pat-
tern q(X) : T using the same domain as for the running example. 
q(X) : - p (X) . p(X) : - X = 1 .0 . 
p(X) : - X = 1. 
We will consider two different strategies Í2\ ^ f¿2- Under both strategies, we start 
by processing the single rule for q. As a result, the event newcall(p(X): (term)) is 
generated, and q(X) : (term) i—>• _L is added to the answer table. Also, an entry for q 
is introduced in the dependency are table. Now, using Í2\, the analyzer processes the 
two ares for p(X) in the order in which the clauses are written. After traversing the 
ñrst are, the answer p(X) : (term) i—> (real) is inferred and an (initial) updated event 
is generated. The analysis of the second are produces the answer (int) and does not 
update the entry since Alub({X/real}, {X/int}) returns {X/real}. After processing 
the initial update for p, the answer q(X) : (term) i—> (real) replaces the oíd one in 
the answer table, and the ñxpoint is reached without any iteration (i.e., no relevant 
update for the cali). Assume now that f¿2 assigns a higher priority to the second are 
of p. In this case, the answer for p(X) : (term) changes from ± to {X/int} (producing 
an initial update). When the ñrst are is processed the computed answer is {X/real}. 
Now, a relevant update is needed since there is a dependency q(X) : _ =4> [-]p(X) : _ in 
the dependency are table. 
Thus, the certiñeate reduced w.r.t. Í2\ is empty, whereas the one reduced w.r.t. f¿2 
contains the single entry p(X) : (term) i—> (real). Since, as seen above, the strategy 
f¿2 performs a relevant update for the cali pattern p(X) : (term), a checker using f¿2 
will issue an error when trying to validate the program if provided with the empty 
certiñeate. D 
The following theorem (completeness) provides sufficient conditions under which a 
checker is guaranteed to validate reduced certiñcates which are actually valid. 
Theorem 2 (completeness). Let P <G Prog, Da <G ADom, Sa <G A Atora, Ia <G 
AInt and Í2a € QHS. Let FCert= CERTlFlER-FfP, Da,Sa,Ia, Í2a) and RCertfia = 
C E R T I F I E R - R / P , D a , S a , I a , í 2 a ) . Let Í2C € QHS be such that RCertfic = CERTI-
F1ER-R(P,Da,Sa,Ia,f2c) andRCertfta D RCertfic. Then, CHECKER_R(P, Da, Sa, Ia, 
RCertj7a, Í2C) returns FCert and does not issue an Error. 
Obviously, if fic = Í2a then the checker is guaranteed to be complete. Additionally, 
a checker using a different strategy Í2C is also guaranteed to be complete as long as 
the certiñeate reduced w.r.t Í2C is equal to or smaller than the certiñeate reduced 
w.r.t Í2a. Furthermore, if the certiñeate used is full, the checker is complete for any 
strategy. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we have proposed an extensión of the ACC framework which generates 
(and checks) reduced certificates by eliminating from certiñcates the information which 
the checker can reproduce in a single pass. This allows reducing transmission and 
storage costs without increasing checking time. As we have illustrated throughout 
the paper, the size of the certiñeate is directly related to the amount of updates (or 
iterations) performed during analysis. Clearly, depending on the the traversal strategy 
used, different instances of the generic analyzer will genérate reduced certiñcates of 
different sizes. Important efforts have been made during the last years in order to 
improve the efficieney of analysis. The most optimized analyzers aim at reducing 
the number of updates necessary to reach the ñnal ñxpoint [17]. Interestingly, our 
framework greatly beneñts from all these advances, since the more efficient analysis 
is, the smaller the corresponding reduced certificates are. In future work we plan to 
assess the influence that different strategies have on certiñeate reduction. Also, we 
will consider and compare with the case of using the ñxed-point analyzers also on the 
checking side. In this case, since the certiñcate can be recreated at the receiving end 
as much as needed, there is clearly a wide range of trade-offs between the size of the 
certiñcate and the checking time We also plan to incorpórate our new framework for 
generating and checking reduced certiñcates in the CiaoPP preprocessor and to study 
different certiñcate size vs. checking time trade-offs. We also want to investígate ways 
of reducing the t rusted base code (see, e.g., [3,16]) in ACC. 
References 
1. E. Albert, G. Puebla, and M. Hermenegildo. Abstraction-Carrying Code. In Proc. of 
LPAR'04, number 3452 in LNAI, pages 380-397. Springer-Verlag, 2005. 
2. E. Albert, G. Puebla, and M. Hermenegildo. Abstraction-Carrying Code: A Model for 
Mobile Code Safety. Technical Report CLIP7/2005.0, Technical University of Madrid, 
School of Computer Science, UPM, July 2005. 
3. A. Appel and A. Felty. A semantic model of types and machine instructions for proof-
carrying code. In Proc. of POPL'00. ACM Press, 2000. 
4. M. Bruynooghe. A Practical Framework for the Abstract Interpretation of Logic Pro-
grams. Journal of Logic Programming, 10:91-124, 1991. 
5. D. Cachera, T. Jensen, D. Pichardie, and V. Rusu. Extracting a Data Flow Analyser in 
Constructive Logic. In Proc. of ESOP 2004, volume LNCS 2986, pages 385 - 400, 2004. 
6. P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Abstract Interpretation: a Unified Lattice Model for Static 
Analysis of Programs by Construction or Approximation of Fixpoints. In Fourth ACM 
Symposium on Principies of Programming Languages, pages 238-252, 1977. 
7. T. Früwirth, E. Shapiro, M.Y. Vardi, and E. Yardeni. Logic programs as types for logic 
programs. In Proc. LICS'91, pages 300-309, 1991. 
8. M. Hermenegildo, E. Albert, P. López-García, and G. Puebla. Abstraction Carrying 
Code and Resource-Awareness. In Proc. of PPDP'05. ACM Press, July 2005. 
9. M. Hermenegildo, G. Puebla, K. Marriott, and P. Stuckey. Incremental Analysis of Con-
straint Logic Programs. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 
22(2):187-223, March 2000. 
10. Manuel V. Hermenegildo, Germán Puebla, Francisco Bueno, and Pedro López-García. 
Integrated Program Debugging, Verification, and Optimization Using Abstract Inter-
pretation (and The Ciao System Preprocessor). Science of Computer Programming, 
58(1-2), 2005. 
11. G. Klein and T. Nipkow. Verified bytecode verifiers. Theoretical Computer Science, 
3(298):583-626, 2003. 
12. Xavier Leroy. Java bytecode verification: algorithms and formalizations. Journal of 
Automated Reasoning, 30(3-4):235-269, 2003. 
13. J.W. Lloyd. Foundations of Logic Programming. Springer, second, extended edition, 
1987. 
14. Kim Marriot and Peter Stuckey. Programming with Constraints: An Introduction. The 
MIT Press, 1998. 
15. G. Necula. Proof-Carrying Code. In Proc. of POPL'97, pages 106-119. ACM Press, 
1997. 
16. G. Necula and R. Schneck. A Sound Framework for Untrustred Verification-Condition 
Generators. In IEEE Computer Society, editor, Proc. of LICS03, pages 248-260, 2003. 
17. G. Puebla and M. Hermenegildo. Optimized Algorithms for the Incremental Analysis of 
Logic Programs. In Proc. of SAS'96, pages 270-284. Springer LNCS 1145, 1996. 
18. E. Rose and K. Rose. Java access protection through typing. Concurrency and Compu-
tation: Practice and Experience, 13(13):1125-1132, 2001. 
19. K. Rose, E. Rose. Lightweight bytecode verification. In OOPSALA Workshop on Formal 
Underpinnings of Java, 1998. 
A Analysis Graph for the Running Example 
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Fig. 1. Analysis Graph for our Running Example 
Figure 1 shows the analysis graph for our running example. The graph has two sorts 
of nodes. Those which correspond to atoms are called "OR-nodes." An OR-node of 
the form CPAAP is interpreted as: the answer for the cali pat tern A : CP is AP. For 
instance, the OR-node 
{Nl/int} r ec toy (Nl ,R {Nl/int,R/int} 
indicates tha t , when the atom rectoy(Nl,R) is called with description ( int , term), 
the answer computed is ( in t , i n t ) . Those nodes which correspond to rules are called 
"AND-nodes." In the ñgure above, they appear within a dotted box and contain the 
head of the corresponding clause. Each AND-node has as children as many OR-nodes 
as atoms there are in the body. If a child OR-node is already in the tree, it is not 
expanded any further and the currently available answer is used. For instance, the 
analysis graph in the ñgure above contains two occurrences of the abstract atom 
rectoy(N,M) : ( int , term) (modulo renaming), but only one of them (the root) has 
been expanded. This is depicted by a dashed arrow from the non-expanded occurrence 
to the expanded one. 
The answer table contains entries for the different OR-nodes which appear in the 
graph. For instance, there exists an entry of the form 
E[ rectoy(N,M) : ( int , term) i—> ( in t , int ) 
associated to the (root) OR-node discussed above, which is in fact the ñxpoint. De-
pendencies in the dependency are table indicate direct relations among OR-nodes. 
An OR-node Ap : CPp depends on another OR-node Ap : CPp iff the OR-node 
AT : CPT appears in the body of some clause for Ap : CPp. For instance, the 
dependency set for the abstract atom rectoy(N,M) : ( int , term) is 
rectoy(N,M) : ( int , term) => [ { N / i n t , N l / i n t } ] rectoy(Nl,R) : ( int , term) 
It indicates tha t the OR-node rectoy(Nl , R) : ( int , term) is only used in the OR-node 
rectoy(N,M) : ( int , term). Thus, if the answer pa t tern for rectoy(Nl,R) : ( in t , term) 
is ever updated, then we must reprocess the OR-node rectoy(N, M) : ( in t , term). 
B Proofs of Correctness and Completeness 
B . l R e s u l t s for A n a l y s i s 
P r o p o s i t i o n 1. Let Í2 £ QHS. Let Í2' £ QHS be a strategy which assigns the highest 
priority to any updated, event which is redundant. Then, V P £ Prog, Da £ ADom, 
Sa £ AAtom, ANALYZE_F(/S'a,i7/) = ANALYZE_F(/S'a, ÍV). 
Proof. A N A L Y Z E _ F is correct independently of the order in which events in the priority 
queue are processed [9]. Thus, any redundant event updated (A : CP) can be processed 
as soon as it is inserted in the queue. In such a case, there are no ares (DAT\A-.CP = 0) 
in the dependency are table applicable to the event. Therefore, no action is taken. 
Consequently, redundant updates are not necessary for constructing the result. D 
P r o p o s i t i o n 2. Let P £ Prog, Da £ ADom, Sa £ AAtom, Í2 £ QHS. Let AT 
be the answer table computed by PiNAVíZ¥.-R(Sa,Q) for P in Da- Then, an entry 
A(u) : CPA I—> AP £ AT is relevant iffu is true. 
Proof. From the deñnition of function ¡nsert_answer_¡nfo, it holds trivially tha t A(u) : 
CPA I—> AP veriñes tha t u is true iff some event updated(B : CPg) (generated by an 
update with an answer different from ± ) oceurred with an are A : CPA => - B : CPB 
(modulo renaming) in the dependency are table. Therefore, by Def. 2, it is not a 
redundant update as its DAT is not empty. Similarly, by Def. 3, it is not an initial 
update since the answer is not ± . Henee, by Def. 4, it is relevant. As a consequence, 
by Def. 5, the entries for A(u) : CPA '• CP i—> AP with u = true are relevant. D 
P r o p o s i t i o n 3. Let P £ Prog, Da £ ADom, Sa £ AAtom, Í2, Í2' £ QHS. Then, 
ANALYZE-FfSa, Í2/)=ANALYZE_R(/S'a, Í2'). 
Proof. By the correctness of A N A L Y Z E _ F [9], we know tha t ANALYZE_F(S*a, Í2) com-
putes the same answer table than ANALYZE_F(S*a, Í2'). Then, A N A L Y Z E _ F and A N -
ALYZE_R differ only on the instrumentation for detecting relevant solutions and the 
absence of redundant updates which, by Proposition 1, does not affect the computa-
tion of the ñnal answer table. Henee, ANALYZE_F(S'a, fi') computes the same answer 
table than ANALYZE_R(S*a, Í2') and the claim follows. D 
B.2 R e s u l t s for C h e c k i n g 
T h e o r e m 1 ( C o r r e c t n e s s ) . Let P £ Prog, Da £ ADom, Sa £ AAtom, Ia £ AInt 
and Í¿A,^C € QHS. Let FCert= CERTIFIER-F^P, Da,Sa,Ia, ÜA) and RCert= C E R -
TIFIER_R(P, Da, Sa, Ia, &A)- If C H E C K E R _ R ( / P , Da, Sa, Ia, RCert, Í2C) does not issue 
an Error, then it returns FCert. 
Proof. If C H E C K E R _ R ( P , Da, Sa,Ia, RCert, 17) does not issue an Error, then it com-
putes an answer table AT. Let us Assume the following three claims: 
(1) If A : CP i-> AP G AT and FCert contains an entry for A : CP, then it holds tha t 
A : CP >-• AP G FCert. 
(2) If there is an entry for AQ : CPQ in AT, then there is one for AQ : CPQ in FCert. 
(3) If there is an entry for AQ : CPQ in FCert, then there is one for AQ : CPQ in AT. 
Then, from (1) and (2) it holds AT C FCert. From (3), it holds tha t AT =FCert. We 
now prove the three claims separately. 
C l a i m (1) We assume tha t AQ : CPQ I—> APQ G AT. We distinguish two cases. 1) If 
AQ : CPQ I-> APQ G RCert, since RCertC FCert and RCertG AT, then the result holds. 
2) We now consider tha t AQ : CPQ I—> APQ belongs to AT — RCert. We want to prove 
tha t AQ : CPQ I—> APQ G FCert by contradiction. 
The assumption is tha t AQ : CPQ I—> AP¿ G FCert and APQ ^ APQ. This means 
tha t in some step of the checking process, we have evaluated an are of the form: 
AQ : CPQ => [_}Ai : CPX 
such tha t the ñnal computed answer for A\ : CP\ in AT is p\ and FCert contains 
pl as ñxpoint for A\ : CP\, with p\ ^ p\. Necessarily, A\ : CP\ ^ RCert, and 
Ai : CP\ does not suffer updated event which is not initial (otherwise A\ : CP\ has 
to belong to RCert). The key is tha t , for this kind of cali pat terns , C H E C K E R _ R behaves 
exactly equal to C E R T I F I E R _ F ( P , Da,Sa,Ia, íí) if the answer table is initially with the 
contents of RCert. Moreover, by [9]: 
C E R T I F I E R _ F ( P , Da,Sa,Ia,í2') = C E R T I F I E R _ F ( P , Da,Sa,Ia, 17) 
Thus pl = pf, and henee APQ = APQ , which contradicts our assumption. 
C l a i m (2) If AQ : CPQ G RCert or A0 : CPQ G Sa, then the result holds trivially. 
Let us assume tha t AQ : CPQ does not belong to these sets. We again reason by 
contradiction. The assumption is tha t AQ : CPQ does not have an answer in FCert. 
Consider Ai : CP\ G Sa whose evaluation after newcall(Ai : CP{) generates the event 
newcall(Ao : CPQ) in the checking process. Necessarily, during the processing of the 
event newcall(Ai : CP\), the following two ares must have existed: 
A2 :CP2^.A3: CP3 
A2 :CP2^_AQ: CPQ 
corresponding to a rule A2:-..., A¡, AQ, • •., where either A¡ : CP¡ has an answer in 
FCert (different from the existing one in AT) or A¡ : CP¡ has no entry in FCert. The 
former case is impossible for (1). The latter case, reasoning identically, would lead to 
a similar situation. By iterating on the process, we obtain tha t Ai : CP\ has no entry 
in FCert. This is impossible because A\ : CP\ G Sa. 
C l a i m (3) If AQ : CPQ has an entry in RCert, or belongs to Sa, then the result holds 
trivially. Otherwise, the claim follows by contradiction, similarly to case (2). 
D 
T h e o r e m 2 ( C o m p l e t e n e s s ) . 
Let P G Prog, Da G ADom, Sa G AAtom, Ia G AInt and l7n G QHS. Let FCert= 
C E R T I F I E R _ F ( P , Da,Sa,Ia,í2a) and RCertfia = C E R T I F I E R _ R ( P , D a , S a , I a , 170). Let 
17C G QHS be s.t. RCertfic = CERTIFIER_R(P, .D Q , ,S , Q , , 1 Q , , 17 C ) and RCertfia D RCertfic. 
Then, the execution of C H E C K E R _ R ( P , Da, Sa,Ia, RCertf¡a, 17C) returns FCert and does 
not issue an Error. 
Proof. The only cases in which CHECKER_R returns Error are the following: 
— The partial answer AP computed for some calling pattern A : CP (provided in 
RCertfiJ causes that Alub(AP, AP') ^ AP', where AP' is the answer for A : CP, 
i.e., A : CP i—> AP' <G RCert^. But, this is in contradiction with the assumption 
that RCertj7a is a valid reduced certifícate for P. 
— A calling pattern A : CP not provided in RCert^ produces the reprocessing of 
its dependent ares due to some relevant update (LIO in Algorithm 3). But this 
is in contradiction with the assumption that RCert^ D RCert^, since RCert^ 
contains all relevant entries generated by CERTIFIER_R by using the strategy Í2C. 
Thus, CHECKER_R(P, D,S,1, RCertf¡a,üc) returns an answer table AT. Finally, by 
Theorem 1, we know that since no Error is issued, CHECKER_R returns FCert. D 
